In The Matter Of:

Tamesha Means v.
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops

Motions Hearing May 22, 2014

Cheryl E. Daniel
Official Federal Court Reporter
313.234.5165 Ext. 4808

Original File meansvUSCCB052215f.txt

Min-U-Script®

		1
1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN	
3	SOUTHERN DIVISION	
4	TAMESHA MEANS,	
5	Plaintiff,	
6	V Case No. 13-14916	
7	UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF	
8	CATHOLIC BISHOPS,	
9	STANLEY URBAN,	
10	ROBERT LADENBURGER,	
11	MARY MOLLISON,	
12	Defendants.	
13	/	
14	MOTIONS HEARING	
15	BEFORE THE HONORABLE DENISE PAGE HOOD	
16	U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE	
17	231 THEODORE LEVIN BUILDING	
18	COURTROOM 237	
19	DETROIT, MI 48226	
20	THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2014	
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

ĺ			
			2
1	(APPEARANCES CONTINUED)		
2	APPEARANCES:		
3	FOR THE PLAINTIFF:	BROOKE A. MERIWEATHER-TUCKER,	
4		DANIEL S. KOROBKIN,	
5		MICHAEL J. STEINBERG,	
6		AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION	
7		OF MICHIGAN	
8		2966 WOODWARD AVENUE	
9		DETROIT, MI 48201	
10	FOR THE DEFENDANTS		
11	URBAN LADENBURGER		
12	And MOLLISON:	DENNIS J. LEVASSEUR,	
13		MICHAEL J. SERRA,	
14		BODMAN, PLC	
15		1901 ST. ANTOINE STREET,	
16		SIXTH FLOOR	
17		DETROIT, MI 48226	
18	FOR THE DEFENDANT		
19	USCCB:	CAMERON R. GETTO,	
20		ZAUSMER, KAUFMAN	
21		31700 MIDDLEBELT ROAD,	
22		SUITE 150	
23		FARMINGTON HILLS, MI 48334	
24			
25			

			3
1	INDEX	PAGE	
2	MOTIONS HEARING		
3	DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE		
4	BY MR. LEVASSEUR	5	
5	RESPONSE BY MS. TUCKER	13	
6	REBUTTAL BY MR. LEVASSEUR	21	
7	REBUTTAL BY MR. GETTO	24	
8	RE-REBUTTAL BY MS. TUCKER	25	
9	DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS		
10	BY MR. GETTO	26	
11	REBUTTAL BY MS. TUCKER	30	
12	REBUTTAL BY MR. LEVASSEUR	40	
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			

4 Thursday, May 22, 2014 1 Detroit, Michigan 2 3 At approximately 2:20 p.m. THE CLERK: The court calls case number 4 5 13-14916, Means versus United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. 6 7 THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. Put your appearances on, please. 8 9 MS. TUCKER: Brooke Tucker on behalf of 10 Tamesha Means, the Plaintiff. 11 MR. KOROBKIN: Daniel Korobkin appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff. 12 13 MR. STEINBERG: Michael Steinberg appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff. 14 15 MR. LEVASSEUR: Dennis Levasseur appearing 16 on behalf of the Defendants Urban, Ladenburger and Mollison. 17 18 And with me is my associate Michael Serra of the same firm. And I brought along one of our summer 19 20 interns. MR. GETTO: Good afternoon. Cameron Getto 21 22 on behalf of the United States Conference of Catholic 23 Bishops. 24 THE COURT: I have two motions. One is a 25 Motion to Dismiss and one is a Motion for Change of

1 Venue. I would like you to go ahead and argue them 2 both, if you like. I would like to start with the 3 change of venue though. 4 MR. LEVASSEUR: Thank you, Your Honor. 5 That is my motion. 6 7 Once again, Your Honor, good afternoon. Dennis Levasseur for Defendants Stanley Urban, Robert 8 Ladenburger and Mary Mollison. I will refer to them as 9 the individual Defendants so we don't have to repeat 10 their names each time I refer to them. 11 This is the individual Defendants' Motion 12 13 for Change of Venue of this case to the Western District of Michigan. 14 15 The Plaintiff in this case is a resident of 16 Muskegon County, was a resident of Muskegon County at the time the cause of action allegedly arose. 17 18 That was in late 2010 when she sought and received medical treatment in connection with what 19 turned out to be a difficult pregnancy. 20 21 And she sought that treatment at Mercy Health Partners, a hospital in Muskegon. She supposedly 22 went into premature labor and lost a child. 23 24 She claims in her Complaint, which is fairly 25 extensive, but points to the fact she not advised by

Mercy Health Partners of the risk to her if she continued the pregnancy term.

Now, we believe this is kind of a thinly-veiled medical malpractice claim, but instead of suing Mercy Health Partners and the treating physicians and other health care professionals, she elected to sue the individual Defendants and the United States

Conference of Catholic Bishops claiming that Mercy Health Partners did not follow a reasonable standard of medical treatment or care because it was a Catholic hospital, Mercy Health Partners was a Catholic hospital but adhered to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' directives which do not permit abortion services.

Plaintiff also claims that the Catholic
Health Ministries, which is not a party to this case,
had a duty to act in a manner so that patients admitted
to Mercy Health Partners in Muskegon receive proper
care. And Catholic Health Ministries, or CHM, which
again, is not a party, breached its alleged duty by
requiring those Mercy Health Care Partners to adhere to
the directives.

Now, contrary to what Plaintiff tries to suggest in its opposition papers, it has not named Catholic Health Ministries as a party. And perhaps they did so, did not name them, because CHM is an

unincorporated association which would have destroyed diversity of citizenship rendering this case ineligible for filing in federal court and this Court particularly.

Now, but this motion is under 28 U.S.C. 1391, which provides a civil act may be filed in a district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

The purpose of the substantiality requirement is to prevent defendants being hauled into court in a district that has little or no relationship to the dispute.

And it's Plaintiff's burden of establishing that venue is proper in this District and not conclusory allegations that can't satisfy that burden.

Now here, all that the Plaintiff alleges with regard to the individual Defendants with regard to venue is the very conclusory, and frankly, unsupported assertions that venue is proper here because the decision that Mercy Health Care Partners or Mercy Health Partners would adhere to the directives was made by the Catholic Health Ministries in the Eastern District of Michigan. That is all they say as to the propriety of venue as to, frankly, any party, but specifically the individual Defendants.

That is not more than a conclusory assertion

1 based on speculation. They indicate in the response brief at page 2 5 that it is upon information and belief that those 3 directives were adopted in the Eastern District of 4 Michigan. 5 But even if that is true, Your Honor, that 6 7 doesn't satisfy Plaintiff's burden of demonstrating substantiality of actions in this District that gave 8 rise to the what amounts, we believe, to a medical 9 10 malpractice claim. 11 But however you characterize it, venue is 12 still not proper. 13 First off, Your Honor, venue must be proper with respect to all of the Defendants, not just the 14 15 individual Defendants. 16 And Plaintiff's Complaint says nothing about venue with regard to the U.S. Conference of Catholic 17 18 Bishops, also a Defendant, Your Honor. 19 And we know from the Hunt Affidavit 20 submitted by the Bishops that the directives are promulgated in Washington, DC, not in the Eastern 21 District of Michigan. 22 23 So we believe the motion should be granted for that reason alone; that the venue with regard to the 24 25 U.S. Conference is not proper.

Secondly, Your Honor, as to the individual Defendants, according to Plaintiff's Complaint, the Catholic Health Ministries adopted the directives in May of 2009. But, if you look at the Complaint, it is alleged that Mr. Ladenburger was the chair of CHM, or Catholic Health Ministries, in 2010; and Mr. Urban is currently chair of the Catholic Health Ministries.

They're not alleging they have done anything with regard to the directives or couldn't be, frankly, because the directives were, according to the Complaint, adopted in 2009.

So venue is clearly not proper with regard to Mr. Ladenburger or Mr. Urban and the venue motion should be granted for that reason as well.

Now, there is, I should indicate, the law clearly demonstrates in this District, the Domino's case and the Overland versus Taylor case, that venue has to be proper with regard to all of the defendants.

Now thirdly, Your Honor, as to Ms. Mollison, and frankly, the other individual Defendants, venue is not proper in this District because even the nature of the claims in this case is; that is, that the treatment or lack thereof at Mercy Health Partners in Muskegon, that is the genesis of the entire case. What type of treatment she received, or lack thereof, at a hospital

in Muskegon.

We have, frankly, a plaintiff who is a resident of Muskegon, or who was in 2010. We have that she was seen by doctors and other medical health professionals in the Western District of Michigan in 2010.

There is no indication she was ever in the Eastern District of Michigan with regard to any treatment.

Any damages that Plaintiff suffered occurred in the Western District of Michigan.

Now, Plaintiff's Complaint, as you can see from paragraphs basically 18 to 59, goes on at length about what happened at Mercy Health Care -- Mercy Health Partners; what happened in Muskegon. It goes on and on that she was seen on this day, she was sent home, she was seen again on that day.

The standard of care allegations at paragraph 52 all relate to what the hospital in Muskegon did or did not do.

So we believe under the prevailing case law, Your Honor, that venue is not proper here because the substantial parts of the events that gave rise to the cause of action did not occur in the Eastern District of Michigan.

Now even, Your Honor, if venue were proper, we believe the case should be transferred to the Western District of Michigan for the convenience of the parties and the witnesses.

Now, there are a number of factors, of course, that have to be taken into account. The first one is venue is proper in the district to which the movant wants the case transferred.

Well, there is no dispute that the Western District of Michigan is a proper venue for this case. The convenience of the Plaintiff and the doctors and the other health care professionals at Mercy Health Partners in Muskegon are clearly served by transferring. It is those treaters who allegedly carried out the directives. The treaters who saw the Plaintiff. The treaters who allegedly didn't follow the standard of care. For convenience -- and those are all going to be witnesses in this case.

So under the case law we've cited, the McCuiston versus Hoffa case at 313 F.Supp 2d 710 holds, and among others, that the convenience of the witnesses is perhaps the most powerful factor.

I should end out, Plaintiff's opposition to our motion for change of venue does not identify a single witness in this District.

You will note that the individual Defendants are all citizens of different states. That not one witness even they have identified who resides in the Eastern District of Michigan.

And again, as I said, Plaintiff resides in the Western District.

So it is not a matter of really transferring a case to a forum convenient to Plaintiff, it would, frankly, be more inconvenient for this Plaintiff.

And as Judge Quist ruled in the Steelcase matter at 210 F.Supp 2d 920, that where the plaintiff does not reside in the chosen forum or whether none of the operative facts occurred in the district, the court assigns less weight to the plaintiff's choice of forum.

Plaintiff has chosen a forum that actually bears no relationship, in our view, to this case.

And finally, Your Honor, the source of proof of the medical records, again, the witnesses are all in the Western District of Michigan. They can't be hauled into this District to testify. They all live well outside the 100 mile radius.

Therefore, we believe that all the factors for transferring venue to the Western District of Michigan are satisfied in this case, Your Honor. Thank you.

13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 1 MS. TUCKER: Your Honor, the Co-Defendants 2 have also filed papers on this Motion and I'm not sure 3 if they want to address the Court before --4 5 THE COURT: Do you want to argue? I was going to get up and say, 6 MR. GETTO: Your Honor, I think Mr. Levasseur covered all the issues 7 very thoroughly and very properly and I don't think 8 there is anything I have to add. 9 10 THE COURT: Thank you very much. MS. TUCKER: Then I guess it is my turn. 11 Good afternoon, Your Honor. May it please 12 13 the Court, Your Honor, in an attempt to avoid suit in this Court, the Defendants repeatedly attempt to frame 14 15 our claims as ones for medical malpractice, but that is 16 simply not the case. In fact, our claims are far different. 17 18 Our claims are that Defendant USCCB negligently promulgated the directives with the 19 20 knowledge and intent they would govern care provided to pregnant women in Catholic hospitals including the over 21 22 15 hospitals in Michigan. 23 And our claims against the individual 24 Defendants, who are, in fact, representatives of 25 Catholic Health Ministries, for the purpose of this

treatment and care.

litigation, that they adopted the directives in this
District which ultimately dictated the care that Ms.

Means received. And as a result of the actions of the
Defendants, Ms. Means suffered severe emotional
distress. And at a point after she was approximately 18
weeks pregnant, her water broke and she went to the
hospital -- the only hospital in her county -- on three

separate occasions and was denied the necessary

And so it was not because she had the misfortunate on these three occasions just to encounter physicians and nurses who did not know what the proper standard of care was, it was because USCCB's policy prevented any doctor, any nurse, any staff member at that hospital from providing the care that Ms. Means needed. And that is what our claims are about.

As Defendants argued the venue statute that we have sued under, which is 28 USC 1391(b)(2), in that Section, it says that a civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred.

The Sixth Circuit has interpreted this provision as allowing venue in any forum with a substantial connection to the plaintiff's claim.

The Sixth Circuit has further iterated that

it doesn't matter whether or not there are other districts with an even more substantial connection to plaintiff's claim, that it is not going to engage in that kind of inquiry, all that matters is whether the forum that plaintiff has chosen is, in fact, proper.

So as previously stated, our claims center on a policy that was drafted by USCCB and then adopted by Catholic Health Ministries, again represented by the individual Defendants.

Unquestionably then the district where the decision was made, in fact, to adopt the policy has substantial connection to the claim.

There is no other way that the directives drafted in D.C. would ever have been implemented in Muskegon were it not for the actions of CHM in this District.

And Your Honor, I know that the entity of CHM may be somewhat confusing so let me just lay that out at this point.

Trinity Health, which is headquartered in Livonia, Michigan, in the Eastern District, is the second largest Catholic health care system in the country. That health care system, of which Mercy Health Care Partners in Muskegon is a part, has delegated certain responsibilities to Catholic Health Ministries,

and one of those responsibilities deals with the decision whether to adopt certain policies, including the directives.

Because it is an unincorporated association under Michigan law, the law that governs in this case, it can be sued for its acts under its own name or in the name of any of its members. And that is what we have done here.

So all of this argument that the decision that was made to adopt the directives was made by a nonparty is just a red herring, because we have, in fact, sued the representatives of CHM and they are represented here today.

But even if that were true, even if you consider the individual Defendants to be nonparties, despite the fact it was Ms. Mollison that, in fact, signed the document making the directives binding on Mercy Health Partners, even if that is the case, there is nothing in the case law, nothing in the venue statute that says the substantial acts that are necessary for venue that they have to be committed by a party.

Because that provision of the venue statute, it focuses on the claims, and so you look at the entire sequence of events giving rise to the claim to determine whether venue is proper.

and what we are suing on is after the Defendants drafted the directives, somehow MHP had to get the directives, had to be told that it was going to comply with the directives. Or we would not be here. Ms. Means would not have been given substandard care. Ms. Means would not have suffered harm.

And that decision, which Defendants have not disputed, was made by Catholic Health Ministries in the Eastern District of Michigan.

THE COURT: And how do you know that?

MS. TUCKER: Well, for two reasons, Your Honor. One, we had attached a document to our venue motion that lists Catholic Health Ministries' location as Novi, Michigan, which is in the Eastern District.

Two, our allegations for this motion are taken as true and Defendants have not even disputed that CHM made the decision here.

And when venue is proper in this forum, as it is here, Defendants have an incredibly high burden to show that transfer to another forum is warranted.

The factors that courts are instructed to consider by the transfer venue statute 1404(a) is the convenience of the parties and the witnesses and the interest of justice.

So let's look at the parties. This is a diversity action. All of the Defendants are out of state. They have not made any showing that travel to Grand Rapids would be less onerous than travel to Detroit, which is an international airline hub.

As far as the Plaintiff is concerned, they have no right to assert what would be more convenient for the Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has at no point said this forum would be inconvenient for her.

As far as the witnesses --

THE COURT: She is a resident of the Western District; is that correct?

MS. TUCKER: She is, yes.

And as far as the witnesses that are relevant to this action, there are two important things to consider.

One, again, this is not a medical malpractice case, so while there may -- and I repeat "may" -- be some important people in the Western District, this action, the claim occurred two and a half years ago.

Defendants have made no showing that any of the relevant witnesses are still at MHP or actually reside in the Western District.

Most important, witnesses are going to be

those individuals who took part in the drafting and adoption of these policies.

And with respect to the adoption, because
CHM is here, because, as we have stated in our
Complaint, all of the members of CHM are also members of
the Board of Directors of Trinity Health, again located
here, we have every reason to believe that the relevant
people for this action will either directly be in the
Eastern District at this time or will be travelling to
the Eastern District to conduct their affairs.

Defendants have also failed to show that in any way the interest of justice would be better served by transfer to the Western District of Michigan.

So in conclusion then, venue is, in fact, proper in this forum because there can be no question that the decision to, in fact, adopt the directives is a substantial one with respect to the claims that we have brought, not the claims the Defendants say we have brought.

Defendants have not met their burden. And it is their burden, they have not met it, of showing that transfer is warranted. And thus, the action should remain in the Eastern District.

THE COURT: Who do you anticipate will be your witnesses?

20 MS. TUCKER: Well, first, the current 1 members or the past members of CHM we anticipate 2 calling. Two, the members of Trinity Health as they are 3 the parent company of MHP. And as the parent company, 4 they can be instructed to require that employees of MHP 5 appear in this Court. And three, any witnesses that we 6 7 may bring. 8 As I said, this is not our burden. 9 Defendants want a transfer, so they must show that the 10 witnesses they want are, in fact, outside of this District. 11 12 THE COURT: Do you -- but my question is 13 really what witnesses are you going to have? You're going to have CHM, Trinity Health, are you going to have 14 15 the Plaintiff? 16 MS. TUCKER: Yes, we will have the Plaintiff. 17 18 THE COURT: Anyone else? 19 MS. TUCKER: Yes. We will have multiple representatives of USCCB we expect. And we certainly 20 will have plenty of experts that we have already located 21 22 who are, in fact, in the Eastern District of Michigan to 23 explain what the care is that Plaintiff was supposed to 24 receive.

THE COURT: And are you going to have

25

anybody from the hospital in the Western District?

MS. TUCKER: We know that we will have one person who is still there, but with respect to the hospital and the treating physicians back in 2010, Your Honor, we have not yet looked to see where their current residences are.

THE COURT: Are they going to be witnesses?

MS. TUCKER: We expect them to be, yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. TUCKER: Thank you so much.

THE COURT: Do you wish to reply, but do not reargue your motion.

MR. LEVASSEUR: I will be brief, Your Honor.

I should point out, Your Honor, that the physicians who work out of the hospital are not employees of Mercy Health Partners. As with most hospitals, they're contractors so we can't control them.

It would be accurate to say that the parent company of the subsidiary can be forced to bring a witness in, which I believe that is the law, but, with regard to this notion that experts are going to be used, they haven't identified any experts, but the convenience of an expert is probably the least of anybody's concern. They're hired to come and give opinions and that is part of the price of or cost of doing business in testifying

is sometimes it's in different locations.

But even if that was a factor, the Plaintiff hasn't identified any experts that would be testifying.

But you know, the big assumption here that Ms. Mollison or that Ms. Mollison or Mr. Urban or Mr. Ladenburger ever stepped foot in the state of Michigan in 2009 when the directives were adopted, that is Plaintiff's burden. That is Plaintiff's burden to demonstrate that venue is proper in this District and that they engaged in activities that would make it fair for them to be hauled into this District to defend actions that took place in 2010 in the Western District of Michigan.

And however you frame the Plaintiff's claims, whether it is a malpractice case, whether it is simply a negligence case, all I can do is sum up and refer to, again, the Plaintiff's Complaint.

The standards of paragraph 52:

The standard of medical care required MHP to:

- (A) to inform Plaintiff about her treatment options...
- (B) to inform Plaintiff about the health risks...
- (C) to inform Plaintiff about the fact if

23 1 she continued her pregnancy there was virtually no chance that the fetus would 2 survive to term; 3 (D) to provide appropriate medical care to 4 5 Plaintiff. All of that, you know, sums up the basis of 6 7 the claim. 8 Where the directives were all adopted or not 9 has no bearing on the ultimate allegations in this case; 10 that is, whether she received the appropriate standard of care. 11 12 And they framed that issue, Your Honor. That is an issue they framed with the activities of or 13 lack thereof of Mercy Health Care Partners of Michigan 14 15 in mind. Those are the actions, from their own 16 Complaint, that they repeatedly go on about. 17 It is that what is important and those are 18 the witnesses. 19 And even if you were to find venue is proper in this case and it is appropriate convenience, that is 20 who you should consider, people who actually have that 21 standard of care or didn't follow the standard of care. 22 They're in Muskegon. 23 24 And I should note that Plaintiff Counsel has 25 not addressed the fact of venue with regard to the U.S.

24 Conference of Catholic Bishops. Venue has to be proper 1 as to them, and it has to be proper as to each and every 2 one of the individual Defendants, Your Honor. Thank 3 4 you. THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 5 Do you wish to reply? 6 7 MR. GETTO: Actually, yes. 8 Very briefly, Your Honor, Cameron Getto on 9 behalf of the Conference of Catholic Bishops. 10 I think it is very important to have correct on the record, Your Honor, that this Court is going to 11 12 be passing on the legal issues in this case according to 13 Michigan law, a tort case at its heart, and there is no pendant federal tort law. 14 15 Assuming that Michigan law will apply to 16 this case, this is most certainly an action alleging 17 medical malpractice. There can be no question that it 18 is. Michigan statute 600.1483, and a number of 19 20 other statutes, govern what constitutes medical malpractice cases. 21 22 The Supreme Court in Brian versus Oakpointe Villa is a case that essentially states any time a 23 24 licensed health care provider is accused of malpractice

and medical issues are involved, you have a malpractice

25

case on your hand.

There is going to be a central issue, if we ever get to the merits, which I'm not here to address because we're asserting that personal jurisdiction doesn't apply, but the point is this is definitely a medical malpractice case under Michigan law. I don't think there is any reasonable argument to the contrary.

What they're trying to say is it is not a medical malpractice case but what the Defendants did caused medical malpractice to occur. Under Michigan law, that is a malpractice case, Your Honor. Thank you.

MS. TUCKER: Your Honor, may I briefly reply?

THE COURT: Are you going to say something new that you didn't say before?

MS. TUCKER: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. TUCKER: One, to address his claims that under Michigan law our claims are essentially ones for medical malpractice, in the Bryant case, it sets forth a two-part test for courts to use to determine whether an action is one for medical malpractice or one for negligence, and in that case, the threshold is whether the claim is against a licensed health care provider or is it against a nonmedical entity. And if it is against

a nonmedical entity, that case says you can't even sue it for medical malpractice under Michigan law.

So since the Conference of Catholic Bishops and the individual Defendants are not medical providers, they could not be sued for medical malpractice, and in fact, have not been sued. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Now let's go to the Motion to Dismiss.

MR. GETTO: Thank you, Your Honor. I do believe that we, all the parties have done an excellent job of briefing this issue, so I'm not going to belabor the issues that are raised in the briefs.

And I'm not going to go all through the cases, although I do believe the briefs set forth that virtually every single, if not every single, case cited by Plaintiff is distinguishable for the unusual and unique facts of this case.

Instead, Your Honor, what I would like to focus on is kind of the bigger picture, the more global picture.

There is a central flaw I think in the idealogy or the methodology that Plaintiff is using to pursue personal jurisdiction over the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.

What Plaintiff doesn't seem to understand is

because the USCCB is a professional organization, it doesn't tell bishops what to do, bishops tell it what to do.

Moreover, Plaintiff has completely neglected to create any connection between the promulgation of these directives, which occurred in Washington, DC -- entirely in Washington, DC -- and which were published in Maryland and what occurred in this case.

Essentially, Plaintiff's central argument was the Plaintiff was the victim of malpractice by a physician who was an independent contractor of a health group, that was in some way affiliated with a larger parent organization, that was also a health group, that was in some way a member of the USCCB.

With due respect to Plaintiff, there is not a single case in any of these briefs that comes close to addressing that tenuous of a connection.

And in fact, if we turn to some of the cases in the Plaintiff's brief, like for example the Lanier case, I think what we find is the opposite. In every single one of these cases, the connection was between the plaintiff and the defendant in the case.

Here, we have no connection whatsoever between the Plaintiff and the Defendants, and instead, an attempt to chain together an intermediary connection

with other people in an attempt to create personal jurisdiction in Michigan.

In Lanier, there was the attempt to make the connection between Dr. Lanier and the Board of Endotonics to a contractural arrangement whereby the prestige of the Board's certification would be conferred upon Dr. Lanier of Michigan in consideration of her pledge to the Board's criteria for certification eligibility.

Mainly, I mean, it is obvious that in this case, the Board's contract with Dr. Lanier of Michigan was for the purpose of establishing a business relationship. It is a contractural type of a claim.

I set forth in the long footnote on page 2 of my brief the recitation of each case that the Plaintiff has cited and why that connection has nothing to do with the connection in this case.

Again, each case cited by the Plaintiff is a direct connection between the plaintiff and the defendant.

I don't think that the Plaintiff seriously contests general jurisdiction, although it appears that a number of contacts, and I mean, in this day and age it is impossible for an organization the size of USCCB not to have some contact with Michigan on some occasions,

although they cite to some contacts, and none of them come close to any of the analyses in any of the cases that would give rise to a claim, in my view, for general jurisdiction.

I'm not going to use up the Court's time with that argument because I don't think it is being meaningful contested at this time.

When we turn our attention, Your Honor, to specific jurisdiction, again, the connection here supposed by Plaintiffs and that is alleged by the Plaintiff, doesn't involve the Plaintiff and the Defendant.

Every single case having to do with specific jurisdiction talks about the reason jurisdiction is being conferred on the Court is because of the connection between the plaintiff and the defendant. I think the concept is whether or not the actual subject matter of the dispute occurred in Michigan.

And here, the USCCB didn't do anything in Michigan. It had no physical presence in Michigan. It committed no acts in Michigan. There is just nothing.

And I believe this is a central flaw in Plaintiff's case.

I don't believe they have in any way, shape or form put together the argument that this Court has

personal jurisdiction at this time.

Now, I should throw in here at the end that it was unclear to me why the Plaintiff argued waiver.

Now, we filed a special appearance, Your Honor, in this case, and we made three things clear. One, that we intended to contest venue. Two, that we intended to contest personal jurisdiction. And three, that we didn't intend to waive anything. We were out to be the first to the courthouse steps in arguing venue, but we were placed in a position where we felt we were obligated to respond. So we responded.

When I then filed this motion, I received a response that says, oh, I filed my own motion, you have waived. I don't believe that we waived anything. This was not a responsive pleading. It is not a pleading at all. It is not even a substantial defensive move because it is venue. It is a procedural issue.

I would just ask that the Court disregard that argument. I think it is somewhat disingenuous that our perceived constitutional rights to individuals and organizations would argue that we have in some way waived our right to contest personal jurisdiction in this case, particularly under the circumstances and given all of the trouble that we went to to make it clear to everybody what we were doing and the fact that

nobody objected. 1 Thank you, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 3 MS. TUCKER: So as Defendant ended on 4 5 waiver, I would like to start with the waiver issue. We don't dispute what Defendant just said. 6 7 It did file a special appearance, and as it says now, it says that it filed it so it can do a whole host of 8 things. It wanted to preserve its defense of personal 9 10 jurisdiction. It wanted to argue venue. It didn't want to waive anything. 11 One, special appearance does not contemplate 12 13 all these things. It is for one purpose and that is to preserve the defense of personal jurisdiction. 14 15 So when USCCB filed its special appearance 16 and said it was going to concur and then told Plaintiff that it was going to file a response to its 17 18 Co-Defendant's motion, Plaintiff then, I think understandably said we would like a chance to respond to 19 both you and your Co-Defendants. 20 But again, it was a response intended and 21 22 that USCCB's relief would be a concurrence, which is 23 something seeking concurrence, which is something 24 seeking the exact same relief as Co-Defendants but 25 perhaps for different reasons.

However, what USCCB did when it filed its response, it asked for something that even its own Co-Defendants didn't even ask for. Instead of asking for a change of venue, USCCB says it wants the case outright dismissed because of improper venue.

That is a defense under Rule 12(b)(3). The federal rules say that you can either present the defense of improper venue in an answer or in a motion under 12(b). Then the rules go on to say in 12(g) that you're required to raise all of your 12(b) defenses in a single motion. Rule 12(h) then says if you don't, then the defense that you failed to raise in that motion is waived.

It cannot be seriously contended that the response USCCB argued wasn't answered though it can only be a 12(b)(3) motion since it did request dismissal for improper venue.

However, Defendant states in its reply brief on page 6 that it did not assert or request any relief not already raised in its Co-Defendants' motion. Yet, on page 9 of its Co-Defendants' motion, in the Conclusion section, the individual Defendants say Defendants respectfully request that venue be transferred to the Western District of Michigan. That is all they asked for.

However, on page 8 of USCCB's Motion, in its Conclusion, it states that Defendant USCCB requests it be dismissed from the case for lack of proper venue.

Alternatively -- alternatively -- the Conference concurs

Thus, USCCB itself recognizes that it is both concurring and filing its own separate request for relief.

in the request for transfer of venue by Co-Defendants.

And in our brief, we have cited cases from the Sixth Circuit and across the country where a party has filed a brief requesting dismissal for improper venue and subsequently tried to file another brief requesting dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction and courts have unanimously said you cannot do that. The Sixth Circuit did not even allow a pro se defendant who said, you know, you should construe it liberally, courts, because I'm a pro se defendant, the Sixth Circuit said, no, the rules are very clear and they do not allow that.

So we think that Defendants have waived any personal jurisdiction argument.

However, even if that is not what the Court finds, personal jurisdiction is proper in Michigan for the following reasons.

One, Defendants consistently tried to refer

to our claims as something completely novel and unprecedented. But Defendant has acknowledged here today that USCCB is a professional association, and there are a whole line of cases that we have cited in our brief that stand for the proposition that when such an association voluntarily undertakes the task of drafting policies, standards, warnings for third parties to use with the intent that the third parties use them, and if the third party actually uses them and causes another person harm, the association is liable for that harm. This is not new. Nothing novel about our claim.

However, regardless of whether that is so, there is certainly no novelty in the idea that in out-of-state defendants that purposely directs its out-of-state activities into the forum state, it can be subject to jurisdiction in that forum state.

This has been the case since International Shoe was decided over seven decades ago.

So when we look at International Shoe and what the law is that the Sixth Circuit has set forth, one, that the Defendant has purposely directed its activities towards the forum. Two, that the case arises out of those activities. And three, that jurisdiction is, thus, reasonable.

So Defendant, I noticed, argued that the

cases require a defendant to have purposely directed its activities towards a specific plaintiff. That is not the case, and there is no case that has stood for that proposition.

What the cases say is the defendant has to direct its activity towards the forum. It also says they arise from the second prong that connects these activities to the plaintiff.

So we'll start looking at how Defendant has purposely directed its activities to the state of Michigan.

Purposeful is a synonym of intentional.

And that is why all the courts, from district courts all the way up to the Supreme Court, focused on the defendant's intent when doing the activity at issue when deciding whether personal jurisdiction is proper.

And to show intent, the Supreme Court in Asahi has stated if a defendant designs the product so that it can go in the forum state, that is evidence of intent.

So let's just look at some of the things that Defendant USCCB has done to design its product for implementation in the state of Michigan.

One, the language of the directives itself.

The directives, the full name of the directives are,

"Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services".

Thus, at the outset, it intended for its directives to be implemented at Catholic hospitals.

Two, the language from the directives says,

Catholic health care services must adopt these

directives as policy and requires adherence to them

within the institution as a condition for medical

privileges and employment and provide appropriate

instruction regarding the directives for administration,

medical and nursing staff and other personnel.

Then it goes on in the directive that anyone who is an employee of a Catholic health care institution must respect and uphold the religious mission of the institution and adhere to these directives.

There has been no dispute that the hospital that Ms. Means went to is a Catholic health care service.

So when it drafted this and said that

Catholic health care services must -- must -- adopt

these directives as policy, it clearly intended that

Catholic health care services in Michigan and elsewhere

would, in fact, adhere to them.

Next, at the end of the directives it says that it is going to, in addition to it, any authority it

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

has and the hierarchy for that, Catholics in the United States. In addition to that, it is going to recommend that the individual bishops that comprise the organization implement those directives in their respective dioceses.

Next, USCCB updates and clarifies its directives, and with respect to this specific directive at the heart of this case, the directive that prohibits termination of viable pregnancies in all circumstances, when there was a Catholic hospital in the state of Arizona that adhered to the directives and was confronted with the situation where a woman was 11 weeks pregnant and had a heart condition that her physician told her death was near certain if she continued the pregnancy. The hospital did not know what to do under the directives and decided that the directives must allow it to perform this life-saving procedure. And so that is what, in fact, it did. A few months later, USCCB then issued a written statement to clarify that its directive does, in fact, not permit the life-saving procedure at issue.

And then, according to its own news service, provided that clarification to all of the bishops, including the bishops with jurisdiction over the hospital Plaintiff went to.

And lastly, let's not forget the obvious, that USCCB's health care policies are not called recommendations or guidelines, they are, in fact, called the directives. And by its own directives, a directive is an order to do something.

The due process that's at issue in this case protects defendants from random unforeseeable fortuitous acts that it had no way of knowing whatever happens.

So in order for USCCB to prevail in this case, it has to be that somehow randomly -- even though it did draft directives and did tell all Catholic health care services it did have to adhere to them, it did provide the clarification on the directives at issue -- that even though it takes all of those steps, it is just a random unforeseeable event that MHP, as a Catholic health care service, went and adhered to the program when it decided what treatment it was and was not going to give to the Plaintiff.

USCCB's claim that it simply drafted the directives, placed them in there and they somehow have no action on USCCB's part is simply not credible.

And lastly, Defendant also attempts to say that what MHP did was the unilateral act of a third party; something it could not at all be responsible for.

And as I've just indicated, the directive

was specifically created for implementation at Catholic health care services.

Michigan is home to the second largest

Catholic health care system in the country. There is no
way that Defendant did not intend when it said in its

language that all Catholic health care services must

adhere to the directive, it did not expect the second

and largest health care system, including the hospital

Ms. Means went to, to adhere to those directives.

And to the extent the Court would like further information on this issue, I would request an opportunity to conduct limited discovery.

And one more point, Your Honor, and just to address an argument that USCCB repeatedly raises in its brief, I just want to be clear to the Court and to the Defendants that this case is not an attack on USCCB's religious freedom. Certainly Ms. Means has no interest in prohibiting USCCB from exercising its opinions and Plaintiff Counsel at the ACLU certainly doesn't either, but what we do take issue with and what is actually at issue in this case is that they cannot make health policy for implementation at hospitals open to the public with the intent that the hospitals rely on that policy where those policies are going to conflict with the applicable standard of care and increase the risk of

patient harm.

And unfortunately, as in Ms. Means's case, actually caused her not to be free of harm and that is what we claim it did and that is all we're claiming.

So in conclusion, USCCB claims that despite its language saying its directives must be followed by Catholic hospitals, despite the fact that there are at least 15 such hospitals in Michigan where the directives are followed, and despite the fact that it was a Michigan hospital's adherence to USCCB's policy that caused Ms. Means's harm, again in Michigan, USCCB's claims it would somehow be unfair for it to even have to defend itself in a court in Michigan.

We respectfully disagree. We believe that it is more than fair because it is through no fault of Ms. Means that when she went to the hospital and that hospital, instead of providing her with the applicable standard of care, adhered to USCCB's directive, as USCCB instructed them to do. That did not happen because of something Ms. Means did, that happened because of what USCCB did.

And for that reason, personal jurisdiction is not only proper and reasonable, it is imminently fair. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Do you wish to reply?

MR. LEVASSEUR: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

I direct the Court's attention to the affidavit of Linda Hunt that is attached to actually both of the motions. She is the Associate General Secretary of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and I think she has six pages of text that explain why there is no connection between USCCB and Michigan.

There can be no question that the USCCB is not home in Michigan. It is 500 miles away. It has no business presence here whatsoever. It doesn't have an office here. It doesn't accept mail here. It doesn't have any landholdings here. It has no property here. There is simply no presence in Michigan that the USCCB has or has had in any time in the distant past.

Under I think the traditional notion of fairness and substantial justice, it is not appropriate to haul the USCCB into court here in Michigan.

But more importantly, Your Honor, if you review this Affidavit to which the ethical directives are attached, you will find no directive that tells anyone, health care provider or anyone else, to breach a standard of care.

You will find no directive that tells anyone

to neglect their legal duty to a patient. You will find no directive that tells anyone that it is okay to harm a patient if it is consistent with your religious beliefs.

Put simply, Your Honor, these don't really say what the Plaintiff says they say. And that is a real problem with the case because these words are the connection that Plaintiff is using to attempt to assert both personal jurisdiction and venue in this case.

With due respect to the Plaintiff, these don't say what they want the Court to believe they say and they don't tell anyone to do anything wrong, anything inconsistent with their legal obligation or harm the Plaintiff.

And for Plaintiff to make that assertion, that is simply a very cynical and, in my view, sinister interpretation of what these ethical principles are.

These are the Catholic church's religious philosophies. They're entitled to it and they're constitutionally entitled to say we believe the Catholics ought to behave this way. But to then argue that they somehow told the doctor to send a woman whose water has broken and is going to lose a baby home, it is far beyond the plausible boundaries of what these ethical directives are, were ever intended to say or could be reasonably interpreted to say.

```
43
                 THE COURT: I'm going to take your motion
 1
    under advisement and I will give you a written order.
 2
                  (Proceedings concluded at 3:15 p.m.)
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

CERTIFICATION I, CHERYL E. DANIEL, Official Federal Court Reporter, after being first duly sworn, say that I stenographically reported the foregoing proceedings held on the day, date, time and place indicated. caused those stenotype notes to be translated through Computer Assisted Transcription and that these pages constitute a true, full and complete transcription of those stenotype notes to the best of my knowledge and belief. I further certify that I am not of counsel nor have any interest in the foregoing proceedings. /S/ CHERYL E. DANIEL, FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER